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ABSTRACT 
 
Small natural features (SNFs), landscape elements that inﬂuence species persistence and 
ecological functioning on a much larger scale than one would expect from their size, can 
also offer a greater rate of return on conservation investment compared to that of larger 
natural features or more broad-based conservation. However, their size and perceived lack 
of signiﬁcance also makes them more vulnerable to threats and destruction. We examine 
the management of SNFs and conservation of the associated ecosystem services they 
generate from an economics perspective. Using the economic concept of market failure, we 
identify three key themes that explain prevailing threats to SNFs and characterize 
impediments to and opportunities for SNF management: (1) the degree to which beneﬁts 
derived from the feature spillover, beyond the feature itself (spatially and temporally); (2) 
the availability and quality of information about the feature and those who most directly 
inﬂuence its management; and (3) the existence and enforcement of property rights and 
legal standing of the feature. We argue that the efﬁcacy of alternative SNF management 
approaches is highly case dependent and relies on four key components: (1) the speciﬁc 
ecosystem services of interest; (2) the amount of redundancy of the SNF on the landscape 
and the level of connectivity required by the SNF in order to provide ecosystem services; (3) 
the particular market failures that need correcting and their scope and extent; and (4) the 
magnitude and distribution of management costs.  
KEYWORDS:  
Biodiversity, Conservation, Ecosystem services, Land use, Small natural feature, Policy  
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INTRODUCTION  
A small natural feature (SNF) is a site with ecological importance that is disproportionate 
to its size; sometimes because it provides resources that limit key populations or processes 
that inﬂuence a much larger area; sometimes because it supports unusual diversity, 
abundance, or productivity (Hunter, this issue). Examples of SNFs include desert springs 
supporting endemic ﬁsh and other native species (Davis et al., this issue), large old trees 
supporting cavity-dependent mammals (Lindenmayer, this issue), caves supporting large 
colonies of bats (Medellin et al., this issue), and coral bommies supporting myriad marine 
life (Lundquist et al., this issue).  
As argued throughout this special issue (see Hunter et al., this issue), SNFs have both 
ecological and socio-economic importance. Because SNFs are relatively small and often 
represent distinct ecosystems, they are surprisingly diverse and contribute to overall 
biodiversity (Lambertucci and Ruggiero, 2016; Davis et al., this issue; Fitzsimons and 
Michael, this issue). SNF-supported species often provide services to human enterprises 
such as agriculture, for example, by pollinating crops and controlling agricultural pests 
(Medellin et al., this issue; Poschlod and Braun-Richert, this issue). SNF-supported processes 
also generate human-valued services. For example, a modest riparian zone in a larger river 
valley can reduce the pollutant load entering the river and help moderate ﬂooding peaks 
through the valley (Watson et al., 2016; González et al., this issue) and some temporary 
water bodies provide groundwater recharge (Acuña et al., this issue; Calhoun et al., this 
issue). SNFs also provide recreational values (e.g., spelunking and snorkeling [Huth and 
Morgan, 2011; Trujillo et al., 2016]), resource extraction (e.g., drinking water [Amondo, 
2013]), and tourism and cultural amenities (e.g., aboriginal sites and cave art ([Rossi and 
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Webb, 2007; Daniel et al., 2012]). While we can generally describe SNFs and the ecosystems 
services they support (see Table 1 and the SNF case studies in this issue), socio-economic 
aspects of SNF management and consequent impacts on the interactions among ecological 
and human systems remain poorly understood.  
Because small natural features support ecosystem services of value disproportionate to 
their size, a focus on SNF management presents opportunities for cost-effective 
conservation, especially compared to larger natural features or more broad-based 
conservation efforts. However, the management of SNFs and the conservation of associated 
ecosystem services are proving to be complex. First, their small stature means their 
over-sized contribution to the landscape's provision of ecosystem services is often 
unrecognized. Second, most conservation practices and polices used today are designed for 
landscape-sized conservation and are mal-adapted for SNF-scale conservation. Third, as 
made clear by the feature-speciﬁc articles of this issue (e.g., Davis et al., this issue; 
Fitzsimons and Michael, this issue; Medellin et al., this issue), formal targeted protections of 
these landscape elements have thus far been limited, making the promise of cost-effective 
conservation from well-managed SNFs a non-trivial task. This synthesis is intended to 
complement the articles of this special issue and call attention to management issues and 
research needs.  
In this paper, we examine the management of SNFs from an economics perspective. In 
particular, we use the economic concept of market failure to explain the human behavior 
behind prevailing threats to SNFs and to characterize impediments to and opportunities for 
SNF management. Market failure is the key concept used by economists and other policy 
scientists to inform environmental policy and natural resource management (Hackett, 2010; 
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Sterner and Coria, 2013). Brieﬂy, most goods and services such as apples, cell phones, and 
haircuts are exchanged through well-functioning markets. In contrast, goods and services 
provided by nature are not typically exchanged in markets because one or more conditions 
prevent their formation or undermine their functioning. Here, we explain the concept of 
market failure in more detail to lay the foundation for discussion of SNF challenges and 
management opportunities.  
We also assess the efﬁcacy of alternative SNF management approaches. We argue that 
efﬁcacy is a function of: (1) the types of ecosystem services generated; (2) the amount of 
redundancy of the SNF on the landscape and the level of connectivity required by the SNF in 
order to provide ecosystem services; (3) the market failures that need correcting and their 
scope and extent; and (4) the magnitude and distribution of management costs. We 
consider the potential mismatch between traditionally used conservation approaches (e.g., 
large-scale reserves) and SNFs, and explore the usefulness of under-utilized approaches 
(e.g., tradable development rights, impact fees, and payments for ecosystem services). 
While we draw on an economic perspective, our arguments acknowledge and appreciate 
other social science perspectives (Ostrom et al., 2002; Dietz et al., 2003; Saunders et al., 
2006; Schlüter et al., 2017) and their important contributions to environmental 
conservation (Berkes, 2007; Daniel et al., 2012; Hilbig et al., 2013). Although full 
consideration of these contributions is beyond the scope of this paper, we incorporate 
insights from these other ﬁelds into our synthesis. Further, by evaluating the need for and 
efﬁcacy of distinct conservation approaches for SNFs, we strive to initiate new policy 
discussions and lines of scientiﬁc research, as well as foster collaboration among natural and 
social scientists (Saunders et al., 2006; Heberlein, 2012; Calhoun et al., 2014).  
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MARKET FAILURES AND ISSUES IN SNF MANAGEMENT  
 
The economic concept of market failure provides a useful means to examine the need for 
SNF management and to assess the performance of alternative conservation approaches. 
Economists identify several characteristics of well-functioning markets (Hackett, 2010; 
Sterner and Coria, 2013). Market failures occur when one or more of these characteristics 
are missing. Of particular importance to SNFs are situations in which third parties are 
impacted in a positive or negative manner despite being outside the producer-consumer 
transaction. For example, landowners who maintain or restore riparian zones or temporary 
water bodies to ensure the quality of their well water may incidentally contribute to the 
quality of neighboring well water (Trenholm et al., 2013; Acuña et al., this issue; Calhoun et 
al., this issue). However, because there is no formal mechanism through which the 
landowner can charge his neighbors a fee for improved water quality, he only engages in the 
level of restoration and ongoing maintenance that meets his private needs. It could be that 
neighbors would be willing to pay an amount for additional riparian zone restoration that 
would more than cover the landowner's additional restoration costs, making everyone 
better off. The foregone value that would accrue to neighbors from additional restoration 
measures is the extent of the market failure.  
Applied to SNFs, three relevant themes emerge when comparing and contrasting market 
failures across different features: (1) the degree to which beneﬁts derived from the feature 
spillover to third parties not involved in its management; (2) the availability of information 
about both the feature itself and the values held by the feature's landowner; and (3) the 
existence and enforcement of property rights and legal standing of the feature. Each is 
discussed below in more detail. Throughout these discussions, we use a simpliﬁed example 
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of a SNF in a terrestrial setting with a single landowner that holds all property rights for ease 
of exposition, although we acknowledge that more complex ownership and property rights 
regimes exist. 
 
Spatial spillovers of SNF-generated ecosystem services  
 
The spatial mismatch between SNF management costs and beneﬁts complicates their 
management. Many SNFs are relatively small and located on a single parcel of land with 
management costs incurred by an individual landowner. In contrast, most SNF-generated 
beneﬁts reach well beyond parcel boundaries to other beneﬁciaries, an economic concept 
known as positive spatial externalities or spatial spillovers. In many instances, the 
landowner is unable to exclude others from receiving the ecosystem services provided and, 
thus, cannot demand payment for these beneﬁts. While some beneﬁciaries might make 
voluntary contributions, others will free ride off the generosity of their neighbors and the 
landowner will not receive full compensation for services provided. Attempts by the 
landowner to capture full payment will likely be too cumbersome to implement, or may be 
impossible due to her inability to exclude others from receiving beneﬁts. 
To illustrate, consider a single large, old tree growing in a meadow. The tree is private in 
the sense that the owner of the meadow can do what she wants with the tree, including 
having it removed. However, her neighbors also beneﬁt from the varied ecosystem services 
provided by the tree. Up to this point, the meadow owner has not removed the tree 
because the private value she has received from viewing the tree and the species that nest 
in its cavities has been greater than the additional cost created by cumbersomely mowing 
around the tree and raking its leaves. Recently, however, the meadow owner has become 
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increasingly annoyed with cumbersome mowing and raking, and is considering having it 
removed; her private beneﬁt of the tree has fallen below her private cost of maintaining it. 
Yet, from society's point of view, the tree's beneﬁt stream is much greater than the meadow 
owner's private cost and social cost-beneﬁt analysis argues for the tree's continued 
presence. Those that value the scenic view created by the single large, old tree soaring over 
the meadow can repeatedly indulge in the beneﬁt it creates at no cost. Unfortunately, 
unless society provides an institution that allows the meadow owner to convert the tree's 
aggregate social value into adequate compensation, she is likely to ignore the societal 
cost-beneﬁt analysis. Even if passersby wanted to pay for the tree's beauty, there would be 
no formal mechanism to do so. Further, any attempts by the meadow owner to exact a toll 
from passersby (e.g., by hiring someone to collect a fee) would likely cost her more than the 
money raised.  
Similar examples occur for other SNFs (Table 2). For example, positive spatial spillovers 
occur when prairie potholes provide duck habitat that beneﬁts hunters and when caves 
provide bat habitat that beneﬁts farmers hundreds of miles away. SNF support of 
biodiversity and other non-use values (e.g., cultural values for sites not visited), where 
beneﬁciaries are numerous and widespread, is the extreme example of a positive spatial 
spillover.  
 
Imperfect information  
 
Information ﬂows between buyers and sellers of goods and services are central to 
well-functioning markets. Management of SNFs and conservation of the services they 
provide is made difﬁcult by a lack of information on the ecological processes that SNFs 
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support and, in some instances, an asymmetry in information among key human actors 
(e.g., private landowners and government regulators). First, a lack of detailed information 
about SNF beneﬁts, combined with their small stature, has led to perceptions of 
insigniﬁcance by landowners, regulators, policy makers, and the public (Acuña et al., this 
issue; Davis et al., this issue; Fitzsimons and Michael, this issue). Even scientists not directly 
involved in the study of a speciﬁc type of SNF may be misinformed of its associated 
ecosystem services. For example, vernal pools are not just small versions of permanent 
wetlands; they provide habitat for a different set of species and perform different ecological 
functions (Calhoun et al., this issue). Rocky outcrops are not lifeless geological formations, 
but supporters of biodiversity by regulating microclimate and providing cavities to escape 
predation (Michael et al., 2010; Fitzsimons and Michael, this issue). Widespread perceptions 
of insigniﬁcance can perpetuate the information problem over the long term as limited 
research, management, and outreach funds will go to natural features perceived to be more 
important.  
Further, the locations of many SNFs are unknown to landowners and regulators given 
their small stature or temporary nature (e.g., temporary wetlands or streams) or that they 
are underwater or underground (e.g., caves or reefs). While recent advances in remote 
sensing techniques (Pettorelli et al., 2014; Jetz et al., 2016) and applications of citizen 
science and mobile technologies (Jansujwicz et al., 2013)offer great potential for locating 
SNFs, some of these technologies or approaches may be expensive to employ consistently 
over large areas.  
Additionally, even if landowners are aware of SNFs on their property, they may not reveal 
this information to government ofﬁcials. If the presence of a SNF could lead to restrictions 
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of their future land use or management options, we can expect some landowners to hide it 
from regulators (Brook et al., 2003), or worse yet, destroy it before the regulator can 
become aware of its existence. This information asymmetry issue is similar to that in 
endangered species protection (Arguedas and van Soest, 2011) and is known as the “shoot, 
shovel, and shut up” phenomenon (Polasky and Doremus, 1998; Lewis and Nelson, 2014). As 
long as the cost of destruction and the probability of the regulator detecting the destruction 
are both low, which is likely to be true of many SNFs, destroying the SNF could be enticing. 
Information asymmetries between resource users and regulators of ecosystem services can 
also be an issue even if the SNF is on public land. Suppose a government gives a logging 
company a timber concession in a publicly owned forest. If the logging company comes 
across an old, large tree that the regulator does not know about, the company is likely to 
have little to no motivation to tell the regulator of its existence unless given an incentive to 
do so.  
Even if signiﬁcance is acknowledged and locations are known, there may still be a lack of 
information on the quality of the ecosystem services provided by individual SNFs. 
Classiﬁcation systems are often used by research scientists and government regulators to 
differentiate among SNF quality (Harris, 1992; van Beynen, 2011). For example, the Maine 
(U.S.) vernal pool regulation distinguishes a subset of vernal pools as signiﬁcant based on 
speciﬁc scientiﬁc criteria. Unfortunately, individual landowners may not fully understand 
these criteria and must either protect the pool not knowing its status (so, perhaps unnec-
essarily) or incur the cost of hiring a consultant to determine its status.  
Finally, if the goal of SNF management is to maximize social welfare, or if the 
management mechanism involves payments to SNF landowners equal to their cost of SNF 
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management, then the implementing government agency or non-proﬁt organization will 
need to acquire information on landowner stewardship values and management costs, as 
well as accurately measure the services the SNFs provide, in order to offer an efﬁcient 
payment. In most cases, ﬁnding all of this information is difﬁcult, if not impossible. 
 
Ill-deﬁned or unenforced property rights, legal standing, and social status  
 
A lack of clearly deﬁned property rights over SNFs, whether the rights are individual, 
communal, or state, can undermine their management. Ill-deﬁned or unenforced property 
rights can result in the overexploitation of SNFs because multiple people will exploit the re-
source and each person's incentive is to exploit what they can before others do. For 
example, if it is unclear who has the right to determine the fate of a coral bommie, an angler 
may race to harvest the valuable ﬁsh resources the bommie supports before his rival anglers 
do. Similarly, scuba divers and snorkelers may arrive in overabundance or during key 
breeding seasons, disturbing wildlife populations or damaging the reef itself. A lack of 
property rights means the individual angler or diver does not have to be worried about 
being punished for any action he takes. Alternatively, if the reef were owned or formally 
managed by an individual, small group, or the local village, decisions over the SNF could be 
more deliberate.  
In some cases, property rights may be well established, but they might conﬂict with one 
another. For example, private rights to land use (e.g., farming or mining) often conﬂict with 
the emerging consensus in many cultures that the public has a right to a certain level of 
environmental quality, and the choice between a “polluter pays” or a “beneﬁciary pays” 
conservation approach will vary among societies, land use type, and ecosystem services 
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provided (Wegner, 2016). In other cases, property rights might belong jointly to a large 
group or even an entire nation (e.g., consider the 200-mile exclusive economic zone in the 
marine realm), with potential for large and often prohibitive costs for coordination of 
management efforts and enforcement. For example, Witjira National Park in Australia was 
formed to protect over 60 mound springs, however the large number of visitors to the park 
and limited ranger presence resulted in many springs becoming degraded (Harris, 1992).  
Many SNFs support ecosystem services with direct use values (Table 1) such as recreation 
(e.g., spelunking in caves), tourism (e.g., visiting hot springs), and resource extraction (e.g., 
collecting guano from caves, harvesting large, old trees) can attract an overabundance of 
users. Often, direct use value is created by physical contact with SNFs that can pose threats 
to the other ecosystem services they provide. For example, caves and rocky outcrops are 
particularly vulnerable to overuse, in part because their hard surfaces create a perception of 
permanence and users are unaware of the subtle impacts their presence makes on the 
physical structure and nearby wildlife (Moncrieff, 2000; Rossi and Webb, 2007). Some SNFs 
in this category have features that attract a speciﬁc use (e.g., cave art viewing, hot springs 
bathing) which then lead to more general uses (e.g., hiking, wildlife viewing) and potential 
abuses in the surrounding area. This is more likely to occur on public lands, but it can also 
occur on private lands.  
Related to property rights is the issue of legal standing. The extent to which SNFs qualify 
for legal protection—for example, are small, temporary water bodies entitled the same level 
of protection as larger, permanent water bodies?—and the extent to which they are 
regarded as signiﬁcant by scientists, government ofﬁcials, and the public, inﬂuences the 
formation and functioning of human institutions. Arguably, the small size of SNFs may 
12 
 
account for a lack of legal and social standing for many of the features examined in this 
special issue. Consider that the US Endangered Species Act provides protection for old 
growth forests, habitat for an endangered spotted owl, but not for individual old, large 
trees, and the US Clean Water Act protects rivers and lakes, but not all temporary wetlands 
or streams. In comparison, temporary streams in Australia are considered watercourses 
similar to larger, permanent streams, while the European Union is inconsistent in its 
treatment of temporary streams depending on the region (Acuña et al., 2014).  
Further, interactions among legal and social standing introduce interesting dynamics 
within this management context. For example, if perceptions of SNF insigniﬁcance exist 
among private landowners, they may ignore regulatory limits on SNF use or destruction. 
Conversely, if perceptions of SNF signiﬁcance exist among landowners, they may act as 
stewards even without formal regulations. For example, farmers in Costa Rica maintain 
remnant trees for personal enjoyment in addition to other more practical reasons like 
ﬁrewood and wind protection (Harvey and Haber, 1998) and two thirds of riparian 
landowners surveyed in Oregon (US) consider land stewardship a moral obligation 
(Rosenberg and Margerum, 2008). Similar dynamics may inﬂuence SNF support and 
research by scientists.  
 
APPROACHES FOR MANAGING SNFS  
 
To address market failures, societies can establish policies, programs, or institutions that 
align the interests of private landowners with social interests, provide or reveal missing 
information, or establish and enforce property rights. In some cases, this will involve 
governments regulating landowner behavior, forcing landowners to bear the management 
13 
 
costs. In other cases, government agencies or non-proﬁts offer ﬁnancial or non-ﬁnancial 
incentives to providers of valuable ecosystem services to facilitate provisioning of the 
socially efﬁcient amount. In still other instances, deﬁning and enforcing property rights or 
changing the legal standing of a resource can lead to better conservation outcomes. 
Generalizing management strategies by SNF type is not useful because SNF situations can 
vary dramatically. Rather, the choice of management approach may be primarily driven by 
the particular ecosystem service(s) of interest and the type and extent of market failures.  
 
Managing SNF with positive spatial spillovers where the “polluters” pay  
 
In situations where regulators or the public at large have decided public rights to 
environmental quality and ecosystem service provision overrule the private property rights 
of individual landowners, a variety of SNF management approaches have potential. In these 
“polluter pays” approaches, the cost burden of managing the SNF to provide the socially 
desired level of ecosystem services falls on the landowner. As we consider alternative 
approaches to manage spatial spillovers, we assume that property rights are well deﬁned 
(i.e., ill-deﬁned property rights are not the reason for market failure and are discussed in a 
later section), while non-excludable beneﬁts that spill over parcel boundaries are the 
reasons for market failure. We begin our discussion with regulatory approaches and 
continue through to more market-based approaches.  
Land use regulations limit the type and intensity of activities allowed on a parcel and 
typically establish a baseline of land-use intensity across a relatively large region. 
Historically, these baselines have been set too high for the sustainable provisioning and 
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socially desired level of SNF ecosystem services (Acuña et al., this issue; Calhoun et al., this 
issue; Davis et al., this issue). There are a number of advantages to untargeted land-use 
regulations. All landowners are treated the same, so there is no need to negotiate speciﬁc 
contracts. Changes to existing regulations can occur without consulting all affected 
landowners. Further, the regulator does not need to know the exact value of the ecosystem 
services provided or landowner opportunity costs to devise policy, and no coordination of 
activities among landowners is required (i.e., there are minimal administrative costs). 
Finally, land-use regulations may also be perceived as equitable as all landowners share the 
burden of conservation. However, because SNFs and their ecosystem service beneﬁts are 
not evenly distributed across the landscape, a typical landscape-wide land-use regulation 
might not target a SNF's conservation problem very well. For commonly occurring SNFs, 
such as prairie potholes in North America and mound springs in southern Australia, 
extremely large opportunity costs could make the policy politically infeasible. Treating all 
SNFs the same may be perceived as equitable, but could be highly inefﬁcient (i.e., not 
cost-effective) if the provisioning of ecosystem services is variable among individual 
occurrences. In summary, untargeted land-use regulations, while administratively 
straightforward, could create large costs for little SNF-generated beneﬁt. Although there are 
several ways to target land-use regulations while reducing overall opportunity costs (e.g., 
Bauer et al., 2010; Freeman and Bell, 2011), increases in regulatory ﬂexibility to address 
ecological heterogeneity often create higher administrative costs. That is, a tradeoff exists 
between the opportunity costs to landowners and the administrative costs to the regulator, 
and it may be unclear which approach minimizes the total cost burden to society.  
Transferable development rights (TDR) programs set an overall limit on the amount of 
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development (e.g., number of housing units) that can take place and distribute these rights 
(i.e., development permits) among current landowners (Chiodelli and Moroni, 2016). There 
are several advantages to TDRs over untargeted land-use regulation. Landowners can use 
the permit to develop their own parcel or sell the permit to another landowner, such that 
landowners are at least partially compensated for not developing. Therefore, compared to 
untargeted land-use regulations, they can minimize the amount that the “polluters pay”. 
When TDRs are combined with additional land-use restrictions (e.g., designated open space 
areas), high quality SNFs can be spatially targeted for lower intensity use, although the 
information costs associated with identifying these SNFs could be large. There are also some 
disadvantages to TDRs. By restricting overall development in a community, TDRs can 
generate high opportunity costs. Alternatively, allowing the same amount of housing but on 
less land can create housing patterns that are less attractive to home buyers (Kopits et al., 
2007). Transaction costs associated with bringing buyers and sellers together in a TDR 
market, as well as ongoing monitoring and enforcement costs, could be high. Finally, 
distributing development rights evenly among current landowners might be socially 
inefﬁcient if some of the landowners receiving a permit were not going to develop anyway, 
thereby being compensated for conservation that would have occurred without the TDR 
program.  
Impact fees are payments from landowners for permitted development or other intensive 
land uses (e.g., a tax on fertilizer or pesticide use) that results in ecological damages. The 
regulator could set a simple one-size ﬁts all fee, thereby lowering administration costs; 
however, this could result in fees that severely under or overvalue beneﬁts and lead to 
increased litigation. Instead, the regulator could attempt to set the fee or tax equal to the 
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value of the ecosystem services lost via the development or land management activity. Such 
a system would ensure that landowners pay for their exact damage, however, the cost of 
determining which ecosystem services will be damaged by an activity and the controversy 
and uncertainty of measuring the level of damage in monetary terms are likely to be quite 
high (Ruckelshaus et al., 2015). This is particularly true in cases where SNF location is 
unknown to regulators or where linkages to ecosystem service provisioning remain highly 
unstudied. Thus, use of impact fees may be best when there are no additional information 
costs.  
 
Managing SNF with positive spatial spillovers where the “beneﬁciaries” pay  
 
In situations where the private property rights of individual landowners are favored over 
society's rights to ecosystem service provisioning, other management approaches may be 
more appropriate. In these “beneﬁciary pays” approaches, the cost burden of managing the 
SNF to provide the socially desired level of ecosystem services falls on those who receive 
value from the ecosystem services and are often borne by government agencies or 
non-proﬁts. Again, we assume for simplicity of discourse that property rights are well 
deﬁned. We begin our discussion of such approaches by summarizing large-scale acquisition 
approaches and continue through to more ﬂexible and individualized approaches.  
The extreme and arguably most common approach to conservation for which 
beneﬁciaries pay involves the outright purchase of land (i.e., fee simple acquisition) by a 
government agency or non-proﬁt organization (e.g., a land trust), that often permanently 
protects the land in a natural state. From an ecological perspective, this approach can be 
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highly successful. However, this approach can also be extremely expensive and is likely 
inefﬁcient for the management of SNFs, particularly small and widely distributed SNFs such 
as temporary wetlands, rocky outcrops, and single large trees that may be able to co-exist 
on working lands (Calhoun et al., this issue; Fitzsimons and Michael, this issue; Lindenmayer, 
this issue).  
Conservation easements separate use rights from the land itself (Rissman et al., 2007). 
Payments are typically made to landowners for the purchase of development rights (PDRs), 
but may also target water, mining, or grazing rights. In other words, the purchaser of 
development or other use rights can target speciﬁc SNF-generated ecosystem services in 
speciﬁc locations. The landowner retains ownership and may continue to use the land in 
other less-harmful ways depending on which use rights remain intact. Conservation 
easements are less costly than outright purchase, but may still be expensive depending on 
the use rights that are given up. Easements do have their issues, however. Determining the 
value of easements can be difﬁcult and large transactions costs may be associated with 
negotiating individual contracts. In addition, because many agreements are termed in 
perpetuity, ongoing monitoring and enforcement costs can be quite high (Fitzsimons and 
Carr, 2014).  
Targeted payments for ecosystem services (PES) and other subsidies can be made to 
landowners as incentives to: (1) engage in some activity or group of activities that maintain, 
restore, or improve the provision of one or more ecosystem services (e.g., creating 
vegetative buffer strips, installing fencing, or delaying mowing); (2) reduce the intensity of 
active land uses (e.g., grazing fewer cattle or building fewer homes); or (3) cease productive 
land use altogether. Payments can be monetary or in-kind and can come from government 
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agencies, non-proﬁts, or the direct beneﬁciaries (Engel et al., 2008; Engel, 2016). Recall the 
meadow owner with her large, old tree; she was bearing the cost burden of providing a 
good that society valued much more than she did. Rather than forcing her to bear this 
burden via a policy that prohibits private landowners from removing old trees, beneﬁciaries 
(e.g., the local community) could pay her for the service ﬂow her tree provides. However, 
the administrative costs of PES schemes can be quite high, and it can be extremely difﬁcult 
to select the best participants from a group of applicants (Sorice et al., 2011, 2012). For 
example, landowners are more knowledgeable of opportunity costs than regulators and, 
therefore, can extract payments that are much higher than their minimum willingness to 
accept (Lennox and Armsworth, 2013; Polasky et al., 2014). In addition, the offering of 
payments may change the framing of environmental behavior and weaken the landowner's 
sense of a moral obligation (Thorgersen, 1996). In both cases, less conservation is 
accomplished than is possible because recipients would have accepted smaller payments 
leaving funds for extra conservation elsewhere. Additionally, if private landowners know 
that the key to conserving landscape-wide ecosystem services hinges on SNF conservation 
on their land, then they may be able to bargain for exorbitant conservation payments 
(Polasky and Doremus, 1998; Arguedas and van Soest, 2011). Further, to maximize gains in 
social welfare, PES schemes have to set payments equal to the value of beneﬁts procured, 
but determining their values can be challenging (Pattanayak et al., 2010). For example, how 
much value does the large tree in the middle of the meadow actually provide to society?  
Finally, while individual landowners will generally account for personal stewardship 
values in their private decision-making, it may be possible to motivate additional 
stewardship through non-monetary rewards such as public acknowledgement of speciﬁc 
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stewardship efforts or through public admonishment of a lack of stewardship (Harvey and 
Haber, 1998; Ryan et al., 2003; Rosenberg and Margerum, 2008; Pasquini et al., 2010).  
 
Managing SNF in situations with imperfect or asymmetric information  
 
A lack of information can be an impediment to SNF management. Subsidies that offer 
education opportunities to landowners and regulators about the ecosystem services 
provided by SNFs can help to change perceptions of insigniﬁcance that leads to better 
management. Subsidies in the form of research funds can help to develop and promote new 
remote sensing technologies (Pettorelli et al., 2014; Jetz et al., 2016). Public education can 
foster citizen science programs to help locate SNFs (Jansujwicz et al., 2013). In the case of 
asymmetric information, where the landowner knows the location of a SNF, the use of 
auctions rather than direct payments for ecosystem services is one way to get landowners 
to reveal their private values (Stoneham et al., 2003; Jack et al., 2009). In other situations, 
motivating stewardship values may be enough to gain landowner participation in 
conservation programs.  
 
Managing SNF in situations with imperfect property rights  
 
While situations of a complete lack of property rights are rare, situations where 
ownership rights are established but use rights are ill-deﬁned, unenforced, or conﬂict with 
each other occur frequently on public lands and in the marine environment. For common 
resources like these, ill-deﬁned use rights can induce problems of over-exploitation. Man-
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agement for direct use values often focuses on limiting the type, timing, or amount of use at 
the location of the SNF itself.  
Permits and licenses are regulatory mechanisms that allow holders to use a particular SNF 
in a proscribed way. In this manner, governments can use permits as a mechanism to 
establish speciﬁc property rights. A government agency limits or regulates the number and 
type of permits issued, which may have a temporal (e.g., seasonal, day/night) or tiered-use 
(e.g., unrestricted access/restricted access requiring a permit/no access) conﬁguration. 
Permits may be given away for free, sold for a fee, or may be auctioned to the highest 
bidder, with generated revenues used to cover infrastructure, administrative, monitoring, 
and enforcement costs.  
User fees are market-based mechanisms that establish prices for public goods and 
services. The idea is that by charging a fee, direct use can be reduced. Prices can be 
implemented using different types of market segmentation (e.g., higher prices during peak 
use times or higher prices for more intensive uses) with the idea that higher prices will 
lower demand for SNF use. For many ecosystem goods and services, determining the 
socially efﬁcient price can be a challenge. In those cases, survey research and other 
non-market valuation techniques can be used, for example, to determine park and cave 
entrance fees (Tapsuwan et al., 2010). Again, revenues can be used to cover a variety of 
management costs.  
As an alternative to formal property rights regimes, local communities or user groups 
(e.g., hunting associations or spelunker societies) can establish informal institutions, such as 
community-based conservation plans, and social norms that facilitate cooperative and 
sustainable management that beneﬁts the entire community (Ostrom et al., 2002; Dietz et 
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al., 2003; Berkes, 2007). These types of arrangements beneﬁt from local knowledge and 
social peer structures.  
 
SNF management synthesis  
 
We expect the efﬁcacy of alternative SNF management approaches to be highly case 
dependent and inﬂuenced by four key components: (1) the speciﬁc ecosystem services of 
interest; (2) the amount of redundancy of the SNF on the landscape and the level of 
connectivity required by the SNF in order to provide ecosystem services; (3) the particular 
market failures that need correcting and their scope and extent; and (4) the magnitude and 
distribution of management costs. Below, we consider each of these components in an 
effort to provide insights for practitioners, regulators, and policy makers.  
Most broad categories of SNFs provide a wide variety of ecosystem services (Table 1); 
however, an individual SNF occurrence may be most valued for its provision of one kind of 
service. One cave may contain prehistoric cave art and be a popular tourist attraction, while 
another may be a hotspot for spelunkers, and still another may be a major roosting site for 
hibernating bats. Identiﬁcation of the speciﬁc ecosystem service of interest is important 
because it determines: the spatial extent of the landscape/seascape that managers or 
regulators have to worry about (i.e., the conservation zone), the uses of that landscape that 
are impairing the ability of the SNF to provide its services, and how many parties need to be 
involved in the feature's conservation. Some ecosystem services provided by SNFs (like ﬂood 
control) require coordinated activity across large landscapes and other ecosystem services 
can be affected by landscape-wide disturbances like pollution (e.g., vernal pools). 
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Conservation of these ecosystem services will require many people to be involved in a 
conservation plan. In other cases, such as protecting roosting habitat for bats in caves, 
conservation activities may be focused on a smaller geographic area and involve few parties. 
When the conservation zone is large, conservation costs will generally be higher. 
Coordinating intervention will also be more difﬁcult. If the number of landowners needed 
for conservation success is low, then market or incentive-based approaches (e.g., land 
purchases, easements, and payments for ecosystem services) are simpler. If many 
landowners need to be involved, then simple and crude approaches (e.g., land-use 
regulations, education) will often work better.  
The level of redundancy of the SNF on the landscape and the level of connectivity 
required by the SNF in order to provide ecosystem services inﬂuence the appropriate 
conservation approach as well. For example, consider a series of caves in an area that all 
provide roosting habitat for bats. If each cave is unremarkable except for their habitat 
provision, then the destruction of some of the caves in the series may not appreciably affect 
the habitat service provided by the cave system. However, if one of the caves contains 
prehistoric cave art, while another is a hotspot for spelunkers, then each cave in the system 
has to be conserved or the provision of one or more ecosystem services will be lost. The 
ﬂexibility of conservation strategies decreases as feature redundancy and connectivity 
requirements increase.  
The types and extent of market failures associated with SNFs greatly inﬂuence the 
efﬁcacy of alternative conservation approaches. A complete understanding of the ecological 
processes and associated ecosystem services is lacking to some degree for all SNFs (Hunter 
et al., this issue). This lack of information favors the use of crude and simple approaches 
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such as untargeted land-use regulations or outright purchase, which are quite expensive, 
and perhaps explains the limited formal protections in place to conserve SNFs. Looking 
ahead, research and education that improve understanding of the linkages between SNFs 
and the ecosystem services they provide will broaden the feasibility and efﬁcacy of more 
complicated approaches and address information problems including the “perception of 
insigniﬁcance” challenge. Managing to address ill-deﬁned or unenforced property rights 
may be key for some SNFs, because without someone or some group with authority to make 
decisions and establish legal protections, it will be impossible to take steps towards formal 
management approaches. Given the likelihood of multiple types of market failures, 
strategies that rely on multiple approaches (polluter pays and beneﬁciaries pay; market and 
non-market based approaches; education; property rights) may prove most successful 
(Kinzig et al., 2011).  
The magnitude and distribution of management costs also affect the efﬁcacy of 
management approaches. Relevant costs include opportunity costs (i.e., foregone use 
beneﬁts), management (administrative, monitoring, enforcement) costs, transaction 
(information, contracting, coordination) costs, and, in some cases, acquisition costs (Naidoo 
et al., 2006). Large-scale reserves are not likely to be cost-effective for managing the 
majority of SNFs due to the high costs associated with purchasing land outright. In 
comparison, economic incentives that reduce land-use intensity rather than eliminating all 
land uses, cost less and are beginning to show promise (e.g., see Perkins et al., 2011; 
Robertson et al., 2014). These lower costs are much more likely to fall within organizations' 
conservation budgets than larger landscape level projects.  
Community attitudes towards conservation can inﬂuence the dominant property rights 
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regime (i.e., “polluter pays” versus “beneﬁciary pays”) which ultimately determines who 
incurs the management cost burden. Sharing the cost burden among landowners and the 
rest of society may result in higher total costs, but may provide more equitable (and 
perhaps more politically feasible) alternatives. However, there are many factors that 
inﬂuence conservation behavior including how an individual identiﬁes socially (e.g., as a 
rancher or as an environmentalist) and the existence of multiple identities can lead to social 
conﬂict (Saunders et al., 2006). Social norms guide behavior, but changing social norms 
requires motivation in addition to education (Schultz, 2011). Understanding and capitalizing 
on patterns in human attitudes and behaviors towards SNFs, as well as the structure and 
nature of human policies and institutions regarding SNFs, affords tremendous opportunities 
for creating multiple pockets of cost-effective conservation across the larger landscape.  
 
SUMMARY  
 
In this paper, we examined the management of small natural features (SNFs) and 
conservation of the associated ecosystem services they generate from an economics 
perspective. Using the economic concept of market failure, we identiﬁed three key themes 
that explain prevailing threats to SNFs and characterize impediments to and opportunities 
for SNF management: (1) the degree to which beneﬁts derived from the feature spillover to 
third parties not involved in its management, creating a mismatch between those who incur 
the costs of management and those who beneﬁt; (2) the availability of information about 
the location and quality of the features, and the values they provide to the feature's land-
owner and society at large; and (3) the lack of existence and enforcement of well-deﬁned 
ownership and use rights, and legal standing of the feature. While these types of market 
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failures are not uncommon in biodiversity and ecosystem service conservation, SNFs' small 
stature, perceived insigniﬁcance, and unexpected large-scale spatial beneﬁts increase the 
likelihood of SNF conservation failure.  
After reviewing several conservation approaches, we noted that the efﬁcacy of 
alternative SNF management approaches is highly case dependent and relies on four key 
components: (1) the speciﬁc ecosystem services of interest; (2) the amount of redundancy 
of the SNF on the landscape and the level of connectivity required by the SNF in order to 
provide ecosystem services; (3) the particular market failures that need correcting, and their 
scope and extent; and (4) the magnitude and distribution of management costs. The 
combination of these components for a speciﬁc SNF determines the most effective 
conservation mechanism(s).  
These insights provide input to an initial roadmap for future conservation strategies 
(Hunter et al., this issue) and represent a ﬁrst step in facilitating collaborations among 
natural and social scientists. Information, laws, institutions, programs, and technology 
designed to overcome these issues can seize opportunities for cost-effective SNF 
conservation. Research and education that improve our understanding of the linkages 
between SNFs and the ecosystem services they provide offers critical support of these 
efforts. Similarly, new remote sensing and mobile technologies and applications of citizen 
science offer tremendous potential. Finally, close collaborations among natural and social 
scientists (Saunders et al., 2006; Heberlein, 2012) will continue to expand our understanding 
of human and natural systems and the possibilities for SNF conservation.  
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